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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\ \' alker Bank & Trust Company, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ 
vs. 
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and State Bank 
of Provo, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 
9947 
APPELLA~S' REPLY BRIEF 
THE C.A.SE OF THE FOUR ANOMALIES 
In our opening brief, appellants have pointed out: 
1. The anomaly of the second largest bank in the 
State of l__Ttah, with thirteen branches and resources in 
excess of $240,000,000, a member of a multi-state bank-
ing chain having nearly $6,000,000,000 in deposits and 
some 44 i banking offices located throughout the eleven 
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Western states, claiming to be irreparably injured by 
the only branch of a small independent bank in Provo, 
Utah, having only $7,000,000 in deposits. · 
2. The anomaly of a large metropolitan bank with 
numerous branches using as a sword against a small 
independent bank a statute designed as a shield to pro-
tect small independent banks from the monopolistic 
tendencies of a large chain banking system.I 
3. The anomaly of the plaintiff's argument that 
it is not the fact that it has a branch in Provo, but that 
the defendant State Bank of Provo itself is there, that 
precludes defendant from establishing a branch in 
Provo, Utah. 
Respondent's brief presents a fourth. Walker Bank 
argues in its Point 1 that the statute in question is clear 
and unambiguous and therefore the court should not 
look to the intent of the legislature or resort to any of 
the other principles of statutory interpretation. But 
in its Point 2, 'Valker Bank's argument is that when 
the legislature referred to "a bank or banks," it must 
have meant ubank or banks or, a branch thereof.-'-' If the 
court must, on Point 2, apply the rules of statutory 
construction to interpret section 7-3-6, Walker Bank's 
argument on Point 1 for a disregard of those rules in 
reading that same sentence falls of its own weight. 
tWalker Bank and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., the two 
banks having branches in Provo had, in 1962, 44.4 per cent of 
all banking offices in the State and held between them 51 per 
cent of all the bank deposits in the State. Report on Bank Holding 
Companies, Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Rep-
resentatives, 88th Cong., 1963. 
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It has been appellants' position throughout that 
whether the question of statutory interpretation be con-
sidered in the light of the fact that Walker Bank has 
a brandt in Provo or the fact that the State Bank of 
ProYo is the only bank in Provo, the language of the 
whole statute and the history surrounding its enactment 
must be considered to determine the legislative intent. 
Appellants' position is in accord with the basic 
principle of statutory interpretation recognized by this 
court: 
" ... 'in the exposition of a statute , the inten-
tion of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal 
sense of the terms ... ' " Norville v. State Tax 
Commission, 98 Utah 120, 97 P.2d 937, 939 
(1940). 
'Vhether this principle is reached by thought process 
alone or with the aid of more divine counsel, appellants 
are pleased to note that this court's approach finds sup-
port in scripture. As St. Paul said in his second letter 
to the Church in Corinth, 
"Follow not of the letter, but of the spirit, for 
the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." 2 
Corinthians 3 :6. 
I. 'V ALKER BANK'S RELIANCE ON ONE 
SENTENCE OF SECTION 7-3-6 IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE STATUTE OR THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION. 
,y alker Bank states its position bluntly. It claims: 
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" ... Section 7-3-6 prohibits the operation of 
branches in any city not of the first class where 
a bank is already located, except only where a 
branch results from a bank taking over an exist-
ing bank." Resp. Br. P. 3. 
This result may not be absurd to the Walker Bank, 
for every branch it has established outside Salt Lake 
County has been secured by taking over an existing 
bank such as in Provo, in Logan, and in Price. 
But the result is absurd when applied to the only 
bank in the community-it is absurd to tell the people 
of Provo the only way the only bank chartered to serve 
that community may provide additional banking services 
is for the State Bank of Provo to take over itself! 
Walker Bank makes no attempt to explain why 
the legislature would have intended such an absurd 
result. It first cites Union Trust Company v. Sirn1nons, 
116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949). But that case 
did not deal with the problem of the only bank in that 
community seeking to establish a branch of itself. In 
that case, the Union Trust Company, a Salt Lake City 
bank, was seeking to establish a branch in Ogden where 
there were located other banks. This involved the very 
situation in which the legislature intended to protect 
local banks from outside invasion by branches. That case 
supports defendants', not plaintiff's interpretation of 
the statute. 
Walker Bank then argues the statute is "clearly 
unambiguous" and thus there is "no occasion to resort 
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to rules in aid of statutory construction or search for 
the statute's meaning beyond the statute itself." Re-
spondtw:nt's Brief, page 7. 
That conclusion is not the law. 
"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain 
the true meaning where the language of a statute 
is of doubtful meaning, or where an adherence 
to the strict letter would lead to injustice, to 
absurdity, or to contradictory provisions." 82 
C.J.S., Statutes, §322. 
A clear exposition of the proper approach to statutory 
construction is the statement for the Supreme Court 
hy l\Ir. Justice Reed in United States v. America·n 
Trucking Association~ 310 U.S. 534 (1940): 
"In the interpretation of statutes, the function 
of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe 
the language so as to give effect to the intent of 
Congress. There is no invariable rule for the dis-
coverv of that intention. To take a few words 
from their context and with them thus isolated to 
attempt to determine their meaning, certainly 
would not contribute greatly to the discovery of 
the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute, par-
ticularly in a law drawn to meet many needs of 
a major occupation. 
"There is, of course, no more persuasive evi-
dence of the purpose of a statute than the words 
by which the legislature undertook to give ex-
pression to its wishes. Often these words are suf-
ficient in and of themselves to determine the 
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have 
followed their plain meaning. When that mean-
ing has led to absurd or futile results, however, 
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this Court has looked beyond the words to the 
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even 
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd 
results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly 
at variance with the policy of the legislation as 
a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, 
rather than the literal words. When aid to con-
struction of the meaning of words, as used in the 
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 
'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear 
the words may apear on 'superficial examina-
tion.' The interpretation of the meaning of 
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, 
is exclusively a judicial function. This duty 
requires one body of public servants, the judges, 
to construe the meaning of what another body, 
the legislators, has said. Obviously there is dan-' 
ger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative 
purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the 
judges' own views or by factors not considered 
by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of 
the danger is the best assurance of escape from 
its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a 
literal interpretation dogma which· withholds 
from the courts available information for reach-
ing a correct conclusion. Emphasis should be 
laid, too, upon the necessity for appraisal of the 
purposes as a whole of Congress in analyzing 
the meaning of clauses or sections of general acts. 
A few words of general connotation appearing 
in the text of statutes should not be given a wide 
meaning ,contrary to a settled policy, 'excepting 
as a different p·urpose is plainly shown." Pages 
542-544. 
Thus in its argument, Walker Bank makes several 
errors of omission. 
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1. It has failed to deny or meet appellants' show-
ing that the result Walker Bank claims from a literal 
reading of one sentence of the statute is completely 
absurd-that the only bank in the community cannot 
establish a branch of itself. United States v. A.merican 
Trucking Associations~ sup1"a~ Girardi v. Lipsetts~ Inc.~ 
275 F.2d 492 (3rd Cir., 1960), United States v. Gertz~ 
~-H) F .~d 662 (9th Cir., 1957). Walker Bank's literal 
reading of one sentence o£ the statute would reach the 
absurd result that in any city not of the first class-
any city other than Salt Lake City-where there is only 
one bank, the legislature intended that same bank's 
existence would preclude it from establishing a branch 
of itself in that same community even though the Bank 
Commissioner and the Governor found that the public 
convenience and advantage would be subserved and 
promoted thereby. 
2. It brushes off as a "nebulous theory" the history 
of branch banking legislation and the very framework 
of the Utah statute itself which makes it clear that 
the legislature was intending to protect unit banks in 
cities outside Salt Lake City from invasion by larger 
city banks and argues for a literal reading which would 
frustrate that legislative purpose. United States v. 
American Trucking Association~ supra. 
3. It bases its claim of "clear and unambiguous" 
language on the reading of only one sentence of the 
section dealing with branches. Federal Trade C ommis-
sion t'. TuttleJ 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir., 1957): 
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"As the Supreme Court has repeated several 
times: 'In expounding a statute, we must not be 
guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole 
law and to its object and policy.' " Page 614. 
4. It offers no explanation for the entire fourth 
paragraph of section 7-3-6 making special provisions 
with respect to branches in communities outside Salt 
Lake County. As this court noted in Allen v. Board of 
Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P.2d 756 (1951): 
"This being so the court should have looked 
at the conditions and circumstances which moti-
vated the framers of the Constitution and sub-
sequent Legislatures in placing boards of edu-
cation in cities in a separate administrative cate-
gory from school districts and counties outside 
of cities, and, if ascertainable, to define the ob-
jectives to be obtained thereby." 
5. It offers no answer to the constitutional question 
posed by the restriction on branches outside Salt Lake 
County contained in paragraph 4 of 7-3-6 (See Appel-
lants' Brief, pages 38-39). 
We submit that the whole of paragraph 4 of sec-
tion 7-3-6 must be read together. Its second sentence 
was clearly designed to supplement the first by prevent-
ing the circumvention of the legislative intent by merely 
establishing a new unit bank one day and branching it 
by acquisition the next. 
The entire paragraph in question reads as follows: 
"Except in cities of the first class, or within 
unincQrporated areas of a county in which a city 
10 
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of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
be established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank or banks, state or national, regu-
larly transacting a customary banking business, 
unless the bank seeking to establish such branch 
shall take over an existing bank. No unit bank 
organized and operating at a point where there 
are other operating banks~ state or national, shall 
be permitted to be acquired by another bank for 
the purpose of establishing a branch until such 
bank shall have been in operation as such for a 
period of five years." (Emphasis supplied). 
If the unit bank organized and operating at the 
point where there are other operating banks may not 
be acquired by another bank for the purpose of making 
it a branch until the unit bank has been in operation 
for at least five years, then it must also be true that a 
unit bank, organized and operating at a point where 
there are no other unit banks operating, may be acquired 
by another bank for the purpose of making it a branch 
without waiting until it has been in operation for five 
years. The presence or absence of other banks at the 
point where the proposed take over is to occur. is the 
critical factor in determining whether or not the bank 
to be acquired must have been in operation for at least 
five years. 
If the presence or absence of other banks is the 
determining factor in the takeover restriction of the 
paragraph in question, is that not also the determining 
factor in the first restriction embraced within the same 
paragraph? That is, the restriction on where branches 
may be established with relation to unit banks, par-
11 
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ticularly, where the second restriction was clearly de-
signed to prevent circumvention of the first. So when 
the legislature said "No branch bank shall be established 
in any city or town in which is located a bank or banks," 
it meant as it said expressly in the second restriction, 
in which is located another bank or banks. The legisla-
ture must have intended both restrictions to apply only 
where there was a competing bank. It did not intend 
either restriction to apply where there was no other 
competing bank. 
It inescapeably follows that the purpose of the 
whole paragraph is to prevent the establishment of 
de novo branches in communities outside of Salt Lake 
County where there is another unit bank in operation. 
In Provo, there is no unit bank other than the State 
Bank of Provo. Therefore, the purpose of the statutory 
restriction is met by allowing that bank to establish a 
branch of itself. 
II. WALKER BANK'S ARGUMENT FAILS 
TO RECOGNIZE THE STATUTORY DIS-
TINCTION B E T "\tV E E N BANKS AND 
BRANCHES. 
In its argument under Point 2 of its brief, Walker 
·Bank, rather than meeting defendants' contentions, mis-
states them and then attempts to dispose of the straw 
man it has thus created. We do not contend that plain-
tiff is not doing a banking business at its branch in 
Provo, and we do not contend that its Provo office is 
a different legal entity. What we do contend is that 
12 
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plaintiff's office in Provo is a branch as defined in the 
applicable statute and that the legislature, in that 
statute, has distinguished between banks and branches 
with respect to the location of branches. 
First of all it should be noted that the applicable 
sentence of the statute refers only to "bank or banks." 
Elsewhere in the same section the legislature has clearly 
distinguished between banks and branches in dealing 
with the location of the latter. Plaintiff's argument 
here is that when dealing with its own branch~ the court 
should not apply the literal language of the statute as 
plaintiff advocates when dealing with defendaf\t's banlc. 
'fo apply plaintiff's own technique, its contention is 
that the statute should read: 
"Except in cities of the first class, or within 
the unincorporated areas of a county in which a 
citv of the first class is located, no branch bank 
sh~ll be established in any city .or town in whicl~ 
is located a bank or banks, state or national, 
[or a branch thereof] regularly transacting a 
customary banking business, unless the bank 
seeking to establish such branch shall take over 
an existing bank." 
Secondly, plaintiff seeks to obfuscate the issue by 
blurring the question of a corporate entity with that of 
the statutory requirements as to location of branch 
offices. Plaintiff argues that the distinction between-
banks ·and branches "has no significance in resolving 
the question of where a banking institution is located 
and transacting business." Plaintiff cites as "grotesque" 
the situation as to First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 
13 
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whose home office is in Ogden, with numerous branches 
in Salt Lake City and elsewhere in the State of Utah. 
But that bank, despite its numerous branches, including 
the one in Provo, is located in Ogden. For example, 
under 12 U.S.C. 94, a national bank may be sued only 
in the district court, state or federal, in which it is 
"located," and a national bank is located "only in the 
place where its principal office and place of business. 
is as specified in its organization certificate." Leonardi 
v. Chase National Bank~ 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir., 1936); 
Buffum v. ChaseN ational Bank~ 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir., 
1951); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 
U.S. 555, 9 L.ed 2d 523 (1963). 
We submit the distinction made by the legislature 
between banks and branches in section 7-3-6 deals not 
with whether they are separate legal entities, but where 
and under what conditions branches may be located-
the very issue presented in the case at bar. 
The legislature first enacted what is now section 
7-3-6 in 1911 when it sought to prohibit branch banking 
entirely. Therefore, the statute began: 
"The business of every bank shall be conducted 
only at its banking house ... " 
Walker Bank claims we ask this court to judicially 
amend this sentence by inserting the word "main" 
before the words "banking house." We submit that the 
legislature could only have meant the main banking 
house when it enacted these words in 1911 as it was at 
that time expressly prohibiting all other banking offices. 
14 
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In 1naa ,the legislature amended the statute by 
adding an exception for branches, so the statute was 
made to read as it now does : 
"The business of every bank shall be conducted 
only at its banking house ... except as herein-
after provided." 
That "hereinafter provided" is the next paragraph of 
section 7-3-6 which authorizes the establishment of 
branches. Then follows a sentence making a clear dis-
tinction between the main banking house and a branch. 
That sentence deals with the location of banking offices 
and begins: 
"All banking houses and branches shall he 
located ... " 
Thereafter, and throughout the entire section of 7-3-6, 
the legislature has used the word '_'bank" when dealing 
with a unit bank or the head office of a chain and the 
word "branch" when dealing with the additional offices 
first authorized in 1933. In using these words in this 
statute, the legislature was not dealing with the concept 
of an octopus-like legal entity with numerous tentacles 
extending throughout the state, but with the problem 
of where and under what conditions additional offices 
-branches-for the conduct of the business of a bank 
(a legal entity) might be located. 
"\Y e ask no judicial amendment of this statute. We 
ask only that the entire statute be read and applied to 
give effect to the legislative intent. On that basis, the 
decision of the Bank Commissioner and the Governor 
15 
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in approving the application of the State Bank of Provo 
to establish a branch on the Brigham Young University 
campus was authorized by law. 
A. Pratt Kesler 
Attorney General 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peter \V. Billings 
John F. Lee 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
State Bank of Provo 
H. Wright Volker 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Spencer C. Taylor 
Bank Commissioner 
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